## NATO Good

### 2AC – Laundry List

#### Collapse causes allied prolif, infighting, and forges stronger US and European military opposition to Russia – simulations prove.

Dr Bastian Giegerich and Liana Fix 19, Director of Defence and Military Analysis for The Military Balance; Professor of International Affairs at the Koerber Foundation in Berlin, “European Security in Crisis: What to Expect if the United States Withdraws from NATO,” [https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/european-security-in-crisis-what-to-expect-if-the-united-states-withdraws-from-nato/](https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/european-security-in-crisis-what-to-expect-if-the-united-states-withdraws-from-nato//), cy

Trump’s musings about a NATO withdrawal have served as a wake-up call for some in Europe that Europeans urgently need to assume greater responsibility for their own security. This realization is one of the reasons why closer defense cooperation and a greater degree of strategic autonomy are high on the European Union’s agenda. But are Europeans able to defend themselves? How would they think about their defense without the United States?

A policy game prepared by Körber-Stiftung and the International Institute for Strategic Studies sought to answer these questions this summer in Berlin. Five country teams with experts from France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States addressed a fictional scenario that involved a U.S. withdrawal from NATO, followed by crises in a NATO member state in the western Balkans and across Eastern Europe. How would Europeans react to such a scenario? What are the red lines, interests, and priorities of the respective actors? How might Europeans organize their defense if the United States withdraws from NATO, and what role could the United States play in European security after the withdrawal?

The results of the game were sobering, with no clear upside for any of the participating teams. While a one-time simulation exercise, it provided valuable insights into the interests and preferences of European member states.

At the beginning of the policy game, most European teams adopted a “wait-and-see” approach focused on persuading the United States to return to NATO, offering concessions that were unthinkable before (from trade to energy). The unfortunate message for transatlantic relations seems to be that a threat to abandon NATO might actually yield some results.

Europeans started to take proactive steps only once the security situation in the scenario deteriorated significantly, and when it became clear that the U.S. withdrawal decision — at least in this simulation — was irreversible. Faced with a crisis in a NATO member state in the western Balkans (in the scenario, a pro-Russian coup d’état with Russian warships blocking access to the Mediterranean Sea), most teams anticipated that remaining NATO members would struggle to agree to invoke the principle of collective defense under Article 5 in this grey-zone scenario. Instead, the invocation of Article 4 — which involves only consultations in case the security or independence of a NATO member state is threatened — paired with sanctions on Russia and a robust response within ad-hoc coalitions were the preferred means of action. Without U.S. security guarantees, it seems, the credibility of Article 5 and the mutual defense commitment are questionable.

And then it got worse: In case of an escalation in the east (an incident akin to the Cuban missile crisis, involving an extended-range version of the SSC-8 Screwdriver land attack cruise missile with a range in excess of 4,500 km stationed in western Russia), European shortfalls especially in air and missile defense were identified as an existential risk for European countries without nuclear capabilities after the United States has withdrawn all nuclear and missile defense assets in the scenario. Given that filling these gaps would require long-term investment, Europe would likely remain vulnerable for years to come in such a scenario.

Especially for Germany, a U.S. withdrawal from NATO would represent an existential security threat. The German team suggested exploring the possibilities of the Franco-German Aachen Treaty of 2019 and asking France and the United Kingdom to expand their nuclear umbrellas to other European countries. Developing a German nuclear weapons capacity was considered an unlikely option, due to domestic opposition. Yet, expanding the British and French nuclear umbrella would come at a significant cost: The burden-sharing debate would return to Europe. Nuclear deterrence will remain the Gretchenfrage of European security, and if expanding the British and French nuclear umbrella fails, some teams anticipated a proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

When it comes to institutional frameworks, from a French perspective, NATO would be dead without the United States: The French team preferred a new, E.U.-centered collective defense structure in the long term, with other actors affiliating on a bilateral basis. This position was met with skepticism especially from the British and Polish side; Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom were adamant that the NATO command structure should be maintained after a U.S. withdrawal and provide possibilities for the United States to “opt in” to any future security structure.

A post-Brexit United Kingdom, as envisioned in the scenario, would consider itself a leading actor in European security, willing and capable of shaping Europe’s future security architecture. Given its significant defense capabilities, the U.K. team saw its country in a powerful negotiating position and was skeptical of French and German leadership on defense issues. British red lines were the following: No E.U. army, no E.U. alliance or, as they said, the United Kingdom wants to design European security, not just sign on a dotted line.

As the representative for NATO’s most vulnerable-feeling eastern member states, the Polish team did not trust Europe’s ability to organize collective defense and was tempted to conclude bilateral deals with the United States. As the Polish team said, if the United States withdraws, the eastern flank should be the last place. A “bilateralization” of security and defense with the United States, including bilateral security guarantees, is the likely consequence. Interestingly, all teams rejected Russian overtures for conflict resolution in exchange for concessions on security, such as drafting a European security treaty based on Medvedev’s 2008 proposals. This demonstrates that Russia was not considered a credible security provider in Europe, despite suspicions that Germany might be tempted to engage in a dialogue with Russia on this.

### 2AC – Russia

#### Putin’s actions centered NATO’s focus away from imperialist operations onto Russia. The existence of NATO is necessary to preserve peace.

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Very few Americans could find tiny Montenegro on a map. Fewer still could offer a cogent description of the differences between Slovenia and Slovakia.

Most can’t name the three Baltic countries. Yet thanks to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s charter, which was signed 70 years ago in Washington, every American is bound by law to defend with blood and treasure each of those nations, and 22 others to boot.

To many who lived through the Cold War, the alliance may seem like an obvious good deal. By binding Europe’s democracies together, NATO decreased the chances of the brutal conflicts that dominated the continent through the end of World War II. NATO provided a strong counterweight to Russia, and communism more broadly, helping defeat that ideology virtually without firing a shot. And when the U.S. went to war in Afghanistan after 9/11, the NATO allies went with us in their first and only exercise of Article 5.

Most of all, for decades NATO–the alliance for which I was Supreme Allied Commander from 2009 to 2013–was America’s forward operating base for democracy, embodying shared values that were worth defending and even dying for.

But the Cold War is long over, and new challenges require clear thinking, not nostalgia. Originally conceived, as its first leader, Lord “Pug” Ismay, quipped, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down,” what exactly does NATO exist to do now? Its expansion to the tiny countries named above raises legitimate questions of common purpose and shared values. Russia is back and playing a much subtler role in undermining and threatening the organization. China’s emergence as America’s most powerful global competitor makes NATO seem anachronistic. Is the alliance, as President Donald Trump called it, “obsolete”?

The short answer is no. Many of the American interests it served in the Cold War are still advanced by NATO today, and walking away from the alliance will likely cost us more than staying and strengthening it. That shared fate is being celebrated in early April as NATO marks its 70th anniversary in Washington with events including an address by its Secretary-General to a joint session of Congress. But to save the alliance and advance the democratic values it was founded to defend, its leaders must take aggressive, creative action.

The fact is, NATO is in trouble.

The original alliance was optimized for the lengthy, bipolar Cold War and had a relatively simple mission: stop the Soviets. It was a very costly approach that required massive expenditures on troops in Europe–around 400,000 at one point, compared with 62,000 today. But with only a dozen original members and a few added along the way, NATO was relatively tight in both size and mission.

After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, NATO 2.0 began with a breath of optimism, sometimes described as a “new world order,” with the U.S. firmly in the driver’s seat and the alliance reaching out in friendship to the former Warsaw Pact countries–including to the Russian Federation. This was a sort of springtime in European security when the idea of a Europe “whole and free” and at peace, as then President George H.W. Bush envisioned it, felt distinctly possible. But a combination of Russia’s increasing resentment as its former allies joined NATO and the global drama of the 9/11 attacks created a new reality.

At the same time, NATO 2.0 began conducting counterterrorism and antipiracy campaigns in Iraq, Libya, the Horn of Africa and Syria, either through formal alliance missions or close cooperation among alliance members. These “out of area” operations became increasingly controversial and damaged not only the popularity of the alliance with other countries but also political cohesion within it. I felt this constantly in Brussels as Supreme Allied Commander, briefing the leadership of the then 28 nations: the air and sea campaign in Libya truly split the alliance; the Afghan campaign, with its rising casualty count, appeared to be a quagmire; and, later, debates over whether to have a formal NATO mission in Syria, on the border of NATO member Turkey, led to difficult sparring matches in the North Atlantic Council, the governing body of the alliance. It felt like the organization was fragmenting badly at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century.

It was the avowed NATO hater Vladimir Putin, ironically, who revitalized the alliance and launched NATO 3.0. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 gave new purpose to NATO. I vividly remember attending an alliance meeting shortly after I took command in 2009 during which Chiefs of Defense of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania laid out a passionate, intelligence-based briefing on the possibility of Russian intervention in the Baltic countries. I assessed it to be a very low probability at that moment, but in the years afterward, I became increasingly concerned. We updated our NATO defensive war plans, conducted significant training exercises and requested additional forces across the organization to maintain a higher level of readiness. Putin’s subsequent actions, including the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines jet over Ukraine and increased aggression in the air and on the high seas around NATO’s periphery, drew the alliance together.

But even as NATO reawakened, the challenge from outside was changing. Putin has practiced “hybrid warfare” against his neighbors, the would-be NATO members Georgia and Ukraine. A lethal mixture of propaganda, social-network manipulation, cyberoperations, special forces and unconventional terrorist-like attacks poses a different kind of threat than the tanks and missiles of the Cold War. Could Russia make a similar set of moves on a NATO ally?

Unlikely, but possible. And that threat only gets more difficult to counter with the advent of advanced military technology. As the tools of offensive cyberwarfare continue to grow–making definitive attribution of an attack difficult to achieve–Russia might be tempted to subvert smaller NATO allies in the Baltics or the Balkans. Doing so, Moscow might calculate, could create fissures in the alliance as the larger nations debate their willingness to fight for a tiny ally. Over time such a strategy could cleverly apply pressure to the real Achilles’ heel of NATO, its already shaky political will. It would be a smart tactical move by Putin, who seems increasingly prepared to bet that the answer to the foundational question–Would you die for NATO?–is, for many, no.

President Trump is compounding that danger. He excoriated the alliance during the 2016 campaign and hectors the allies at every turn to increase their level of defense spending. That tactic admittedly has had some effect, as several allies have finally stepped up their spending to pledged levels. But it comes at a cost, creating resentment and division in response to the President’s hostile and threatening tone. Worst of all, Trump himself has called into question America’s Article 5 commitment on multiple occasions, most recently with regard to Montenegro.

That creeping lack of common purpose poses perhaps the greatest risk to NATO. Signs of authoritarianism are already emerging in some of the allied nations, like Poland, Hungary and Turkey. The looming danger of Brexit seems to cut against the core values of the alliance. And the abdication of NATO leadership by the U.S., which for so long stood as a standard of democratic governance for the world, threatens the foundation on which the alliance rests.

For all those harbingers of trouble, though, by many traditional measures, NATO remains extremely healthy.

It is powerful. The 29 nations of NATO produce more than 50% of the world’s gross domestic product, have well over 3 million troops on duty, operate massive combined naval fleets and air forces and together spend over $1 trillion on defense. Indeed, even with all the frustration over European defense spending not hitting the 2% of GDP goal, the collective European defense budget is the second largest in the world after the U.S.’s and is ahead of China’s and Russia’s–combined.

It is smart. U.S. and European defense innovation and production provides a formidable military research and development capacity. Particularly in cybersecurity, unmanned vehicles, space operations, special-forces technologies, maritime and anti-submarine capability, and air and missile defense, NATO is a technology and education superpower.

It is capable. The alliance boasts a large command structure of highly qualified teams of military officers from all of the 29 nations. Throughout Europe and the East Coast of the U.S., those teams prepare war plans, conduct training exercises, monitor readiness of allied units, gather intelligence about potential adversaries and run complex operations centers that cover the entire geographic range of NATO. These standing staffs, which we rationalized by reducing them 35% while I was NATO commander, can conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in a coalition structure on short notice.

Just as important as NATO’s health is the fact that we still need it. Geography matters, and the European peninsula is particularly well located on the western edge of the Eurasian landmass. When I was the Supreme Allied Commander at NATO, people would say to me, “Why do we need all those useless Cold War bases?” My reply was simple: They are not Cold War bases but rather the forward operating stations of the U.S. in the 21st century. When necessary, they allow us to operate in the Middle East and Africa. But they primarily serve as a bulwark: NATO is not global in its scope, scale or ambition and will remain tightly focused on the North Atlantic.

Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with Winston Churchill that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries.

Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that no alliance nation has ever attacked another. NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans.

History provides few achievements that compare to those seven decades of peace. They were built not on the ambitions of cold-eyed leaders but something more noble. NATO is a pool of partners who, despite some egregious outliers, by and large share fundamental values–democracy, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, gender equality, and racial equality. Admittedly we execute those values imperfectly, and they are stronger in some NATO countries than in others. But they are the right values, and there is no other place on earth where the U.S. could find such a significant number of like-minded nations that are willing to bind themselves with us in a defensive military treaty.

So what can NATO do to ensure the alliance continues to provide value for all the members in general, and for the U.S. in particular? What would a NATO 4.0 look like?

The alliance should up its game in cybersecurity, both defensively and in the collective development of new offensive cybertools. Geographically, the alliance needs more focus on the Arctic; as global warming opens shipping lanes and access to hydrocarbons, geopolitical competition will increase. We should taper off the Afghan mission, perhaps maintaining a small training cadre in country and continuing to help the Afghan security forces push the Taliban to negotiate peace.

There is work to do in consolidating the Balkans, where tensions among Serbs, Croats and Balkan Muslims threaten to erupt into war again. NATO can continue to have a small mission there to help continue the arc of reconciliation. The alliance will need to be forthright in dealing with Russia, confronting Putin where we must–in its invasion and continued occupation of Ukraine–but at the same time attempting to reduce operational tensions and find zones of cooperation.

Geographically, the biggest challenge ahead will be the Middle East. The NATO nations do not agree on an approach with Iran, which is an aggressive actor in the region with significant ambitions that will impact NATO. Developing better partnerships with the Arab world, which began in earnest with the Libyan campaign and continued into Syrian operations against the so-called Islamic State alongside various NATO allies in the U.S.-led coalition, makes sense. Working far more closely with Israel would pay dividends for the alliance.

And what of other tiny, would-be members, the next Montenegros? NATO should accept North Macedonia to stabilize the south Balkans, then halt expansion. It should build global partnerships with democracies like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India and other Indo-Pacific nations.

Should we be prepared to fight and die in a NATO campaign? Yes. On balance, the alliance still provides strategic benefit to the U.S. We should support this venerable organization, encourage our allies to increase their defense spending and push them to operate with us on key challenges. We should demand that they help us build a NATO 4.0 that is even more fit for the decades ahead.

We should also remember how dangerous the world can be. As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for four years, I signed more than 2,000 personal condolence letters; about a third of them were to the grieving family members of European soldiers. I visited the thousands of non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan often, and they were uniformly brave, professional and motivated.

As a democracy, it is right that we should debate whether NATO is worth dying for. I can tell you that our NATO allies have shown time and again they are willing to fight and die for us.

#### It’s especially necessary because of Ukraine. Backing down would be a catastrophe.

The Times 22, Britain’s oldest national daily newspaper, 2-15-2022. “The Times view on the Ukraine crisis: Preserving Peace,” The Times, https://archive.ph/lfew2#selection-743.0-743.54

For more than 70 years, NATO has acted as the guarantor of western security. Russian aggression and threats against Ukraine have nothing to do with any supposed provocation by the transatlantic alliance. Demands by the Kremlin that Kyiv forswear forever any ambition to join NATO are a smokescreen for its real objectives and, even if acted upon, would not defuse this crisis. Western governments would merely be inviting further revanchism by President Putin if it entertained them for even a moment, let alone acceded to them.

The notion of a bar on accession to NATO momentarily excited hopes of a solution to the crisis whereby 100,000 Russian troops have massed across Ukraine’s eastern border. Vadym Prystaiko, Ukraine’s ambassador to Britain, appeared to suggest in a BBC interview on Sunday that Kyiv might abandon the aim of joining NATO as the price of avoiding war. A spokesman for Mr Putin said that, while this did not mark a change in Ukrainian policy, it would be a step in the right direction.

Mr Prystaiko swiftly retreated from any such insinuation yesterday, however, saying his remarks had been misunderstood and that the aim of accession to NATO remained part of Ukraine’s constitution. And so it does. Ukraine’s government has compelling reason to seek a way out of the crisis and to lift the threat of invasion. Russia’s illegal annexation of part of Ukraine’s territory in 2014 and continuing warfare, with about 14,000 lives lost to date, are a disaster and an outrage.

Ukraine has requested an urgent meeting with Russian representatives to discuss the crisis under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. And Kyiv might judge that preserving a circumscribed type of sovereignty, comparable perhaps to Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, is the least bad option. But for great powers to compel it to adopt such a policy would be unconscionable.

Nor would it even work, for it would demonstrate to the Putin regime that by threats and outright invasion it can change the borders of Europe and dictate the alliances of sovereign states. Other nations would be at risk, including the Baltic member states of NATO that were once subjugated by the Soviet Union. This is no way to preserve peace; it is an invitation to aggression.

The Kremlin’s complaints about NATO are a canard. Russian propaganda maintains that the United States gave a commitment at the time of German unification that NATO would not expand eastwards. That account is not supported by James Baker or Mikhail Gorbachev, the leading diplomatic players on either side at the time. Ukraine’s demands in 2013 were for closer relations with the European Union rather than NATO. It was this that Mr Putin could not abide: the prospect of Kyiv allying with western liberal ideals of constitutionalism rather than Mr Putin’s ahistorical fantasies of a common Slavic civilisation.

Kyiv does not have a right to join NATO, for there are stringent criteria for accession. It certainly cannot meet these when part of its territory is under occupation. But it has every right to aspire to membership, even if there is scant likelihood of its acceding in the foreseeable future. For bigger states to force it to renounce such a policy would violate the terms of the Charter for European Security of 1999, which rejects the notion that big powers can legitimately consider any part of Europe as their “sphere of influence”.

Russia is a signatory of that charter and must abide by its terms. NATO is not the aggressor in this crisis; Mr Putin is. NATO powers should strain to resolve it by diplomatic means, but lasting peace is not secured by acquiescence. It requires resolutely opposing imperialism and aiding Ukraine’s legitimate government. As in the Cold War, preserving peace and maintaining deterrence are not alternatives but the same cause.

#### Russian adventurism in the 21st century.

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Why NATO? Russia’s attack on Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the events that followed clarified the state of the transatlantic security environment and provided a concise answer to the question of why NATO is needed today. The Alliance is needed now for the same reason it was needed when it was created. Now, as then, the UN cannot guarantee collective security against aggression. Transatlantic countries continue to face the same threat, albeit in a different form, that existed when NATO was established. The Alliance has proven effective in its mission for more than seven decades and continues to be necessary for the preservation of transatlantic security and, by extension, the liberal international order. In short, we need NATO in order to maintain world peace. Can NATO Endure? The NATO alliance and the context within which it operates have changed significantly over time. At its inception, NATO focused on the security of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. Today, it protects the majority of European countries, as well as the United States and Canada. It is comprised of 30 Allies, protects almost one billion people on both sides of the Atlantic, and represents half of the world’s military and economic might. The challenges NATO faces and the environment in which it operates are also notably different than those that existed when the Alliance was created. In 1949, NATO guarded against the threat of military attack that could be countered through traditional military strengths. At that time, the Soviet Union was the primary threat to the Alliance. Today, NATO is deterring Russian expansion rather than Soviet expansion, facing an adversary that readily deploys the means of hybrid warfare against its targets in order to achieve its political goals. It is an aggressor that has successfully melded hybrid warfare with information, cyber, diplomatic, political, economic, and social means of warfare.51 Russia is a continually evolving apex predator. Consequently, NATO operates in a rapidly changing and unpredictable environment fueled in large part by a state that operates outside the bounds of international law and works to foil the international system while simultaneously insisting no international question may be resolved without it. Permanently on guard, NATO has successfully adapted to political, economic, and social changes that have altered the international security environment over the course of more than seven decades. The Alliance is the transatlantic community’s perpetual guardian, its constantly evolving primary line of defense. As such, it remains an essential component of transatlantic security and the liberal international order. But, can it endure? Currently, every indication is that NATO is a durable compact: all of its 16 longtime members have remained in the Alliance, 14 new members have joined since the end of the Cold War, and additional countries have joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace with the hope of becoming members of the pact. Despite some assertions that NATO and the ideas that underpin the liberal world order are obsolete, NATO’s image has improved on both sides of the Atlantic amid growing security concerns. And it is generally “seen in a positive light across publics within the alliance.”52 The benefits of membership far outweigh the costs. The price of peace costs less than the price of war and rebuilding. Maintaining Peace in the Twenty-First Century The twenty-first century transatlantic security environment has largely been shaped by a revanchist Russia, which has emerged as the single greatest threat to transatlantic peace and security in the post-Cold War era. Over the course of the past 30 years, Russia’s foreign policies and actions have fallen into well-defined historical patterns. Russia’s resurgent expansionism, use of force to change borders, abuse of its UN Security Council veto, and its hostility toward its neighbors and the liberal international order have created comparable conditions to those that led to NATO’s creation in 1949. The Alliance’s success in maintaining transatlantic peace and security through deterrence, along with Litvinov’s, Henderson’s, and Kennan’s post–World War II observations, provides policymakers with important insights into how to approach today’s transatlantic security situation and how to value NATO. In short, Litvinov pointed out that Russia’s desire to expand is insatiable; Henderson observed that its goals never change; and Kennan advised that Russia understands and respects the logic of force above all else.53 NATO has been an effective and durable alliance, one that continues to be a timely and elegant response to the dangers facing transatlantic peace in the twenty-first century. NATO remains the most effective means of ensuring peace for years to come. Æ

#### NATO imperialism didn’t cause war, Russia’s ambitions did.

Majumdar ’22 (Bhaskar Majumdar, Author and graduated from the AMP from Harvard, “Russian Imperialism, Not NATO Expansion, Caused the Ukraine War” <https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-imperialism-not-nato-expansion-caused-the-ukraine-war/>) //sethlee

As per Mearsheimer’s worldview, NATO in general and the US in particular were at fault for welcoming countries that were in the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Admitting the three former Soviet republics in the Baltics was rubbing salt into wounded Russian pride. This view forgets that the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, expanded in western Europe as well as in the east all the way to the Pacific. In [1979](https://www.britannica.com/event/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan), the Soviet troops even marched into Afghanistan to protect the communist government.

None of the countries that suffered under Moscow’s yoke wants to go back to those. That is what so many of them lined up to join NATO when the Soviet Union fell. Eastern European nations also turned to the EU because of economic opportunities on offer. Poles, Lithuanians and even Hungarians prefer to work in France, Germany and the UK instead of in Russia. In a nutshell, NATO guaranteed security against an imperial Moscow while the EU boosted the economy for Eastern Europe.

An imperial view would see the expansion of NATO as a win for the US and a loss to Russia. However, it might be a good idea not to think of NATO or even the EU expanding east but Eastern Europe moving westward. “Go West, young man” had a new meaning for Poles suffering from nightmares of the 1943 [Katyn](https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/katyn-massacre) Forest Massacre when the Soviets slaughtered the flower of Polish society.

Obviously, Russia did not like the eastward expansion of NATO or the EU. For a historically imperial power, this was deeply humiliating. In particular, the Soviet collapse scarred Vladimir Putin. This former KGB officer ended up driving a [taxi](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59629670) for a bit. As Atul Singh and Glenn Carle [write](https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/making-sense-of-vladimir-putins-long-game/), the 1990s deeply traumatized Russians “who interpret almost every US action and statement as pieces of a long term, coherent plan to undermine Russia.” Russia claims that NATO threatens its sovereignty by encroaching on its near abroad.

The reality is that NATO armies have no designs on Russian territory. It is Russia that annexed Crimea with impunity and in contravention of international law. Now, it has attacked Ukraine without provocation. It is razing entire cities, killing civilians and committing atrocities in a classically brutal Russian way. The history and the current reality of Russia puts fear into the hearts of its neighbors.  That is why Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO. Their action is defensive, not offensive.

#### NATO is still relevant – multiple examples

Hamilton ’22 (Lee H. Hamilton, Lawyer and Former Democratic U.S House of Representative, “Commentary: NATO still relevant, still facing challenges” <https://www.newburyportnews.com/opinion/commentary-nato-still-relevant-still-facing-challenges/article_b7d2cbe6-845a-11ec-824f-e7dc02262f0f.html>) //sethlee

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the largest peacetime alliance in the world and has been arguably the most successful such alliance in history. It has had remarkable success in achieving its basic goals: containing Soviet expansion, checking the rise of nationalism and helping integrate Europe. It provides a model for multinational cooperation, something we desperately need in today’s complex and dangerous world. and it has shown an admirable ability to adapt to changing needs and circumstances. Three decades ago, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was possible to think NATO had outlived its basic mandate. But it found new and important responsibilities in combating ethnic violence and civil war, as in the former Yugoslavia, and countering terrorism. It maintains an array of peacekeeping and training activities in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. Today, the crisis over a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine presents new challenges to the alliance while reinforcing the fact that NATO is as relevant as ever. It is essential to the security of our allies in Europe; and because their security is closely tied to our own, it is essential to the United States. In a sense, NATO rose from the ashes of World War II. Europe had been devastated. An estimated 36.5 million Europeans had been killed, more than half of them civilians. Millions of people were displaced. America, throwing off its history of isolationism, created the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe’s economy. But Western leaders worried about the region’s military security. Would the Soviet Union seek to extend its dominance into Western Europe? Would nationalist militarism bubble up and lead Europe back toward war? To address those threats, a dozen nations, including the United States, signed the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. In the treaty’s best-known section, Article 5, the members declared that “an armed attack against one of them … shall be considered an armed attack against all of them.” It was a pledge for mutual self-defense. Within months, the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb, putting an exclamation point on the need for deterrence. The Korean War and the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 tested NATO, but the alliance held. It was a measure of the treaty’s success that NATO forces were able to avoid military actions throughout the Cold War. Over the decades, NATO expanded. Today it includes 30 member nations, three of them former Soviet republics: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It also claims partner relationships with nearly 20 European countries. NATO calls its partnership with Ukraine one of its “most substantial” and says cooperation has increased since 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine and seized Crimea. Ukraine has expressed interest in joining NATO. Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who views Ukraine as part of “historical Russia,” portrays that prospect as an existential threat. With an estimated 100,000 troops massed near the Ukrainian border, Russia is demanding a guarantee that NATO won’t let Ukraine join. The threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine poses a real problem for NATO. President Joe Biden said last week that “there are differences” among alliance members about how forcefully to respond, depending on what Russia does. Putin is likely to try to exploit those differences. The best way to resolve this crisis, of course, is through tough, clear-eyed diplomacy, with a clear message that Russia will face consequences if it invades. But it’s harder to negotiate from a position of strength when all your allies may not be on the same page. NATO has achieved remarkable success in maintaining peace and security throughout its 72-year history. It has demonstrated, probably better than any other organization, the importance of multinational cooperation. But as the Ukraine crisis shows, its challenges are far from over. Lee Hamilton is a senior adviser for the Indiana University Center on Representative Government; a Distinguished Scholar at the IU Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies; and a professor of practice at the IU O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs. He was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for 34 years.

### 2AC – Sustainability

#### NATO’s sustainable – U.S. reliance and public support prove.

Simon Koschut 21, Heisenberg Fellow at the Otto Suhr Institute of the Freie University Berlin, Ph.D. from the University of Potsdam, former Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, “Whither the Liberal Security Order: The End of NATO as We Know It?” *Hegemonic Transition*, Chapter 8, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74505-9_8>, RMax

Despite these obvious problems, however, it seems premature to join in the swan song for NATO. Indeed, with the incoming Biden administration there are many indications that NATO will continue to exist. A dissolution or disintegration of NATO cannot be ruled out entirely, but it is not very likely. This is mainly due to two reasons.

First, the US needs NATO in its conflicts with other hegemons. When the Cold War drew to a close, NATO lost its central importance in the eyes of many US decision-makers in Congress and in the White House, e.g., consider the sidelining of NATO during the so-called War on Terror or the Obama administration’s troop surge in the Pacific region in the wake of the so-called Asian Pivot. Recently, however, the organization has regained importance for the US in the course of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the threat to US security interests in the South China Sea. The US, in particular, is currently pushing NATO members to invest more in military defense in order to increase the deterrent potential against Russia and China (Defense News, 2016).

Second, domestic support for NATO remains high in the US. According to a 2016 survey by the Pew Research Center, a majority of the US population continues to see NATO as “good for the US” (Pew Research Center, 2016). This support has even increased under Trump over the past two years. Granted, this is mainly due to the support from the Democratic camp. Among Democrats, support for NATO is particularly high at 78%, compared to only 47% among Republicans. In 2016, the gap between the two parties was only 6% (Pew Research Center, 2018a). This shows an intensification of the party-political division in the US on NATO politics and seems to indicate that Trump’s criticism of the alliance has generated increasing resonance, at least among Republicans. 48 percent of all respondents in the US say that NATO is not doing enough to solve problems globally (Pew Research Center, 2018b). Nevertheless, around two-thirds (62%) of Americans see NATO positively, and the trend is increasing: approval of NATO has improved by 9 percentage points compared to 2017. It is the strongest US support for the transatlantic security alliance in recent years.

The current crisis surrounding COVID-19 has done little to change this. On an operational level, COVID-19 has impacted negatively on NATO’s missions and overall military interoperability. Moreover, the immense financial costs of cushioning the economic effects of COVID-19 will surely affect political debates on military spending. Some even suggest that NATO deterrence may suffer due the pandemic (Mölling et al., 2020). On a political level, and perhaps surprisingly so, the COVID19 crisis has done little to foster political cohesion and solidarity among NATO members. To be sure, COVID-19 has given attention to allied resilience and preparedness according to Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, and many member states have engaged in civilian and logistical support in response to the pandemic. For example, NATO’s Rapid Air Mobility initiative has facilitated the delivery of medical supplies and personal protective equipment to and from several countries, including the UK, Turkey, the United States, and Italy (NATO, 2020). But NATO, as a military security organization, is not well prepared to assist in combatting a global health crisis. As a result, member states have looked elsewhere for international cooperation and assistance or, as in many cases, pursued national policies.

### 2AC – AT: Nuclear Sharing – General

#### Critics of nuclear sharing are wrong.

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Proponents of a withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil argue that it would make Germany and Europe more secure and downplay the potential risks of such a decision. For them, Berlin’s refusal to continually host U.S. nuclear weapons and invest in the next generation of dual-capable aircraft would neither mean the end of nuclear sharing nor undermine NATO cohesion. They often try to distinguish between the so-called technical and political elements of nuclear sharing, arguing that ending the former would not necessarily affect the latter. Pointing to states such as Canada or Greece that once hosted U.S. nuclear weapons but got rid of them a long time ago and still participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, they argue that Germany would still be able to influence NATO nuclear strategy, that the United States would still be willing to protect NATO, and that NATO and the nuclear sharing arrangement as such would continue to exist and function well.

These arguments are based on rather heroic assumptions. First, they assume that it does not matter what you bring to the table. According to Rolf Mützenich, chairman of the Social Democrats in the Bundestag, a withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Germany “would not result in the end of the American nuclear guarantee nor of Germany’s say in nuclear matters … as it would still be guaranteed through its membership in the Nuclear Planning Group.” Yet, it would be very surprising if those states that actively contributed to NATO’s nuclear sharing mission didn’t have more influence than other member states. After all, it is well known that those NATO members that provide troops to allied operations (in particular those that carry special risks) have more influence on NATO strategy for a given operation than other member states.

Second, they implicitly or explicitly argue that it would not make much of a difference for the security provider, the United States, whether their protégés participate in the arrangement or not. After all, they argue, the United States does not need the few non-strategic nuclear weapons on European soil to provide effective deterrence for the whole of NATO. According to the critics, these weapons are militarily useless, because there is no realistic scenario for their use. Yet, many military experts disagree. They maintain that even the current generation of jet fighters could successfully carry out their mission. Moreover, from this perspective, jet fighters carrying gravity bombs provide a lot of operational flexibility and are valuable tools for strategic communication.

It could also be argued that these non-strategic nuclear weapons never really had much military use in a narrow sense. Rather, they have always been political symbols, linking European security to American security. It is important to recognize, though, that “symbolic” does not mean politically unimportant. In contrast, nuclear sharing has also meant reassurance and risk sharing. However, as former U.S. ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, notes, reassurance works both ways: “it’s a two-way street.” For the United States, it will thus make a huge political difference whether U.S. allies are willing to continue to share the risks associated with the nuclear umbrella. In an article for Der Spiegel, two experienced Europe hands, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Jim Townsend, warned in no uncertain terms that “Germany walking away from this vow to share the nuclear burden, this expression of solidarity and risk sharing, strikes at the heart of the trans-Atlantic bargain.”

Third, the German proponents of a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons underestimate the role of their own country. Germany, after all, is not just another member state. To begin with, the country’s role in NATO was a major reason for the very creation of this special arrangement. Its departure from NATO’s technical nuclear sharing arrangement would very likely trigger other “exits” and lead to transatlantic disruption. While the nuclear sharing arrangement may survive a Belgian or Dutch exit, it is hard to imagine that a German withdrawal would not bring about a general crisis of nuclear sharing. According to Flournoy and Townsend, “the bargain sustaining U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to Europe would collapse and the U.S. umbrella would essentially be decoupled from Europe.” At a time of upheaval for the transatlantic alliance and ongoing discussions about a potential “decoupling,” this promises to be a dangerous strategy with potentially far-reaching consequences.

#### We need to hold on to the umbrella.

Christian Ruhl 21, Program Manager for the Global Order at Perry World House; John Gans, director of research and communications at Perry World House; Michael Horowitz, director of Perry World House and Richard Perry Professor at the University of Pennsylvania; 8/23/2021, "Introduction: Emerging Challenges to Trans-Atlantic Nuclear Deterrence," *Policy Roundtable: The Future of Trans-Atlantic Nuclear Deterrence*, Chapter 1, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-trans-atlantic-nuclear-deterrence/, RMax

What Is at Stake?

In a pre-workshop survey, we asked expert participants in our workshop to rate the performance of the “Atlantic Charter,” the aspirational set of principles proclaimed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill 80 years ago, in August 1941.[1](https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-trans-atlantic-nuclear-deterrence/" \l "_ftn1) Sixty-three percent of those polled believed the trans-Atlantic community was “very successful” or “somewhat successful” at ensuring that there are “no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.” Only 27 percent selected “somewhat unsuccessful” regarding the establishment of “a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries.” No one believed the trans-Atlantic community was “very unsuccessful” at this task.

Nuclear deterrence may deserve some of the credit for this perceived success. According to many experts, nuclear weapons helped keep the Cold War cold long enough for the standoff between the Soviet Union and its bloc and the trans-Atlantic community, led by the United States, to end without a shot fired.[2](https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-trans-atlantic-nuclear-deterrence/" \l "_ftn2) And yet, nuclear weapons also presented the Cold War’s biggest, most existential risk to humanity — and they continue to do so. As Ven Bruusgaard writes in her contribution to this roundtable, “It remains a fact that nuclear weapons can bring existential destruction to humanity.” It is important not to lose sight of this gruesome fact in the sometimes technical and often esoteric details of nuclear strategy.

There are questions today about the relative importance of nuclear weapons in the NATO context. Some of the authors in this roundtable remind us that the ability of nuclear capabilities to deter conventional war is an underappreciated reality of nuclear weapons, especially in an era of “great-power competition.” Ven Bruusgaard’s essay also argues forcefully that “U.S. nuclear weapons are likely one factor inhibiting even more aggressive Chinese and Russian policies in their respective neighborhoods.”

A related question is whether, when it comes to nuclear weapons, the trans-Atlantic community should “trade known risks for unknown ones,” as Ven Bruusgaard puts it. For all our participants, the answer is a resounding “no,” which Bunde illustrates with a metaphor inspired by the late Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: We may be in a rainstorm, and we are not getting wet, so we are considering whether we really need our nuclear umbrella. The inability to see the rainstorm while holding our umbrella is frustrating, but our panelists make the case for holding on.

#### Alternatives are worse.

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard 21, assistant professor of political science at the University of Oslo, member of the Oslo Nuclear Project, 8/23/2021, " Anti-Nuclear Sentiment and the Continuing Relevance of Nuclear Deterrence," *Policy Roundtable: The Future of Trans-Atlantic Nuclear Deterrence*, Chapter 5, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-trans-atlantic-nuclear-deterrence/, RMax

This past January, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, after 50 states ratified it.83 This disarmament treaty is unlikely to contribute to reducing nuclear arsenals, given that no nuclear weapons state has expressed any interest in joining it. But the treaty does capture a contemporary sentiment among many non-nuclear NATO member states: that nuclear deterrence is unfashionable, untenable, and out of date. Civil society movements and political youth parties in Europe are pushing the treaty’s agenda hard.84 Nuclear deterrence, to them, has run its course.

The humanitarian rationale for never employing nuclear weapons is compelling and a key reason for the popularity of this anti-nuclear sentiment across Europe.85 It remains a fact that nuclear weapons can bring existential destruction to humanity. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock concludes that we are closer than ever to midnight.86

But the security policy rationale for discarding nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence without thoroughly assessing their alternative is much less compelling. The argument that nuclear deterrence is outdated is detached from the rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons: to enhance states security. It disregards contemporary risks of great-power confrontation. Most critically, it fails to consider what alternative security measures states are likely to take in the absence of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of Security

States that have, or aspire to have, nuclear capabilities do so because of a perceived security need. There is a reason nuclear weapons remain “the absolute weapon.” The potential of nuclear weapons to shape the behavior of other states is simply unique, as characterized by Bernard Brodie.87 The nine states that have acquired nuclear weapons have done so to provide security against what they perceive to be the most pressing threats they are facing, whether nuclear or conventional.

The latter point is important. Not all nuclear weapons states have pursued nuclear capability to match or deter a nuclear threat. Some states seek to influence a conventionally superior or geographically dominant enemy. The utility of nuclear weapons is not universal across nuclear weapons states. Each state’s needs differ, including in relation to other available options they have for preserving their own security. For Pakistan, for example, nuclear weapons remain an essential tool for influencing a conventionally superior India. The states that derive security from nuclear weapons, through their own possession of those weapons or through security guarantees from other nuclear states, will have to pursue that security by other means in the absence of nuclear weapons. This must inform our analysis of the consequences of prohibiting them.

Renewed Great-Power Competition and the Risk of Conflict

The idea that nuclear deterrence is outdated is out of sync with the contemporary security policy context. International relations today are deeply colored by renewed great-power competition between the United States, Russia, and China. The changing distribution of power may produce less peaceful outcomes than what we have seen over the past 70 years. U.S. think tanks keep churning out reports on how the United States should best compete against China.88 China’s leaders remain convinced that the United States is determined to prevent its inevitable rise. Russia is determined to remain a great power, while the United States depicts Russia as a declining power and displays little interest in considering Russian security concerns.

To all these great powers, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain a critical security guarantee. Of the three, Russia seems to rely the most on its nuclear weapons. But the United States also relies on nuclear weapons to deter and manage potential crises with either of the other two countries. Its nuclear arsenal is being modernized to fit this bill.89 Some argue nuclear weapons play a lesser role in Chinese strategy as compared to U.S. and Russian nuclear strategies,90 but recent changes in Chinese nuclear policy raise renewed concerns about Chinese nuclear intentions.91

How nuclear weapons influence the risk of conflict is contested. Many argue that nuclear weapons contribute to deterring great-power conflict and point to the fact that the Cold War remained cold.92 Although this claim is difficult to prove, we do know that nuclear weapons contributed to significantly shaping superpower behavior in this era. Moreover, nuclear weapons states clearly have faith in this logic. On the other hand, one could argue that nuclear weapons pose a significant and growing risk in the event of a conflict. Any conflict in which the great powers perceive that their vital national interests are at stake would likely go nuclear, unless one side were to concede to the other’s demands. Many point to novel risks of entanglement because of an increased commingling of nuclear and conventional strike systems.93 Other emerging technologies may also reduce crisis stability and increase the risk of nuclear escalation.94

What Are the Alternatives?

So, should we trade known risks for unknown ones? We do not know how the partial or full absence of nuclear weapons would affect relations among the great powers. This raises two critical questions. The first is whether conventional weapons can serve to deter nuclear threats. The second is what a conventionalized deterrence landscape would look like.

Consider a world in which more states sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, including some NATO allies, but in which the nuclear weapons states remain reluctant to engage. Putting aside questions about whether it would be possible to remain a NATO member while in the treaty,95 or whether NATO as an alliance would survive this, treaty proponents argue that NATO members that choose to sign the treaty should rely on conventional capabilities to deter nuclear threats. But is this viable?

Most scholars argue that conventional weapons are less effective deterrent tools than nuclear weapons.96 The rapid and unprecedented destruction caused by nuclear weapons sets them apart. Making the threat of conventional denial or punishment credible requires more than nuclear threats: Conventional weapons inflict less damage than do nuclear weapons and can be easier to defend against than nuclear weapons. For these reasons, a larger amount of conventional precision-strike munitions are needed to deter nuclear threats as compared to nuclear weapons.97 The potential of conventional missiles is untested in a contested environment. Sustained arms racing also serves to undermine the deterrent effect of conventional weapons. States that rely on conventional deterrence may have to demonstrate their conventional capabilities on a more regular basis, which could increase the rate and intensity of conflicts.

A partly or fully conventionalized deterrence landscape could be less stable and more conflict prone than the current one. The increased U.S. reliance on conventional deterrence has not led others to follow suit. Instead, U.S. conventional preponderance has produced an increased adversary emphasis on nuclear threats.98 Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has promised nuclear first use in response to the conventional counterforce threat from U.S. precision-guided munitions. These Russian nuclear threats to go first have now produced a changed U.S. deterrence strategy with expanded nuclear options.99 Nuclear weapons remain the only credible deterrent of nuclear employment. Although China seemingly relies more on conventional than nuclear deterrence, its nuclear deterrent remains oriented toward the potential threat from U.S. nuclear first use in a large-scale conflict. For China, U.S. conventional capabilities to deny China its objectives in the Asian-Pacific theater are potentially of diminishing concern. U.S. nuclear capabilities to target the Chinese homeland are seemingly not.

U.S. nuclear weapons are likely one factor inhibiting even more aggressive Chinese and Russian policies in their respective neighborhoods. A world without nuclear weapons could produce more frequent albeit less destructive wars. These could cause destruction and devastation of a kind that we have not seen since the last world war. Although we cannot know, it may be that nuclear weapons will contribute to preserving the peace among great powers. The consequences of removing them from deliberations over the costs of aggression are unknown.

The idea of nuclear deterrence is old, even old-fashioned. However, the security threats nuclear weapons continue to mitigate are as pressing as ever. Although the idea of abolishing these weapons may seem attractive to publics and politicians alike, the implications of their abolition are complex and uncertain. Reducing this uncertainty through a more thorough debate over how states will take measures to secure themselves, absent nuclear weapons, is critical. That discussion is fundamental to determine whether a world without nuclear weapons would be a more peaceful one.

### 2AC – AT: Nuclear Sharing – France

#### France umbrella goes nuclear – escalate-to-de-escalate posture and geography guarantee it

Christine Leah 17, former Chauncey Postdoctoral Associate at Yale University, 2/14/17, “A European Nuclear Deterrent?” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/14/a-european-nuclear-deterrent/

The point is that any country, such as France, that wishes to extend nuclear deterrence in the future would have to significantly change its current posture, which evolved without considering these issues. It could be, for example, that extended deterrence by its nature encourages larger arsenals. Is it reasonable to imagine that France would significantly expand and diversify its arsenal to ensure a second-strike capability not only for the purposes of central deterrence but for extended deterrence as well? Sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), for instance, have a crucial advantage in this respect, since they are less vulnerable to attack than land-based ICBMs and manned bombers. Would France send its force de frappe to sea in a big way? Could it?

Another important distinction is geography. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed vast acreage, making the notion of waging an initially limited nuclear war at least theoretically plausible. It was possible to imagine nuclear exchanges at the margins in defense of allies that left both homelands basically viable. France is probably too small for that, besides which, for that reason and perhaps others, French policymakers never accepted the notion of limited nuclear war, or riposte graduée. France instead relies on an ultime avertissement “ultimate warning,” which seems to rule out the concept of escalation control for the sake of starting-point credibility. The ability and willingness to escalate a small confrontation to higher levels of exchange is a critical component of the credibility of extended deterrence, and the ability and willingness to “fight” a nuclear war, both limited and full-scale, falls into that logic. These two elements—geography and the associated dynamics of both conventional and nuclear escalation—meant that the United States and the Soviet Union had more “time” compared to other potential nuclear dyads, both before and during a nuclear exchange. France doesn’t have these chops, and neither would Japan if it decides to go nuclear. India makes for an interesting question in this regard.

Still other issues beg attention. One is allied dialogue and communication on nuclear strategy. The NATO nuclear planning group and extended deterrence committees with South Korea and Japan since 2010 formally discuss these things. New suppliers of extended deterrence would have to establish such formal consultative bodies for their security guarantees to be credible. Communication, especially in the face of threats, is everything.

More specifically, American extended deterrence was shaped by the rigid structure of the Cold War in such a way that secondary and tertiary issues fell below the political threshold of nuclear threats and protections. In short, the number of triggers for a nuclear crisis was relatively small. But if the nuclear club in the Asia-Pacific were to grow robustly beyond North Korea, a host of new issues might multiply the number of triggers: strong emotional nationalism, territorial disputes, very asymmetric conventional and nuclear balances, the maritime context, and the vulnerability of “young” C3I systems among many.

Just as important, whereas the U.S.-Soviet engagement was both global and bipolar, engagement would be regional and multipolar, especially in Asia. Under such conditions, calculating deterrence sufficiency becomes very difficult. Smaller nuclear arsenals, too, are much more vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and hence parties are more likely to adopt launch-on-warning or launch-on-attack postures. Each party’s nuclear doctrines, postures, and chains of command would not be clear to the other players. They might therefore be much more risk-averse, but risk aversion would probably be offset by doctrines of first-use, pre-delegation to forward-deployed and widely dispersed weapons, and geographical proximity.

The main point is that the general context of strategic interaction during the Cold War cannot be superimposed readily on other situations. Such a simple-minded superimposition was wrong when it was applied to Iraq before 2003. It was wrong when it was (and sometimes still is) applied to Iran or North Korea. And it is wrong when applied to France or Japan or any other would-be security provider.

### 2AC – AT: Nuclear Sharing – Germany

#### End of nuclear sharing with Germany causes extinction.

Rafael Loss 20, European Leadership Network, 2020, “A plea for realism in Germany’s nuclear sharing debate,” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/a-plea-for-realism-in-germanys-nuclear-sharing-debate/>

Dr Mützenich is mistaken. The removal of US nuclear weapons from German soil would undermine the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and, ultimately, increase the likelihood of war in Europe, including that of nuclear use. Exiting nuclear sharing would also raise concerns in the Baltics and Eastern Europe about Germany’s commitment to protect its immediate neighbourhood, end Germany’s influence over launching nuclear strikes, render German preferences less relevant for US policy, remove a geostrategic barrier to Russian armament and unduly jeopardise the already strained relations with Moscow.

To be sure, the pace of nuclear disarmament has slowed since the 1990s. This liberal interlude saw the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the nuclear powers have also cut their nuclear arsenals by some 75% since the mid-1980s, an estimated 13,355 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of nine countries today. This reduction contains an important unilateral component; the United States and Russia, which possess the vast majority of global warheads, have reduced mostly very expensive, excess stockpiles.

But the pace of disarmament has slowed due to dramatic changes in the international security environment. If in the 1990s, Russia appeared to be a strategic partner for the West, then Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which led to its demise, are only the latest indicators for Russia’s re-emergence as a geopolitical competitor. President Putin’s 2005 state of the union speech, in which he ‘described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”’, announced this shift in Moscow’s strategic thinking. Moscow judged that Western hegemony denied Russia its rightful great-power status. A more disruptive Russian foreign policy based on power politics, zero-sum games and spheres of influence was more suitable for recalibrating the global order to better accommodate Russian interests. As President Putin put it at the 2007 Munich Security Conference: ‘we must seriously think about the architecture of global security…[to achieve] a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue’.

The existing Western rules-based order is incompatible with Moscow’s stated objectives. Dr Mützenich’s claim that ‘we [the SPD] orient ourselves not only on our own, national interest, but also consider the interests of other countries, because we know that we can only be strong together’, is thus ideologically commendable but divorced from the geopolitical realities. Unilaterally exiting nuclear sharing is at odds with the SPD’s insistence that German foreign policy must be multilateral and in the European interest. It would prompt questions in the Baltics and Eastern Europe about Germany’s stated commitment to protect its immediate neighbourhood. And yes, Canada and Greece ended nuclear sharing in 1984 and 2001, respectively. But that is precisely why continuity is needed. As the US ambassadors to Poland and Germany warned, Germany’s exit from allied nuclear sharing would ‘diminish nuclear capability and weaken NATO’ by ‘eroding the solidarity that undergirds NATO’s nuclear deterrent’. Another unilateral weakening of the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture—whether through Russia’s violation of arms control agreements or the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from German territory—does not strengthen European security; it merely removes the legal and geostrategic barriers to Russian armament. An arms race could ensue, bringing volatility rather than predictability to European security. Volatility increases the risk of escalation, whether accidental or intentional, including the probability of a nuclear exchange. Instead of unilaterally removing an important element of the security architecture, the SPD should encourage measures to increase strategic stability.

## NATO Bad

### 2NC – Sustainability

#### NATO’s unsustainable – Ukraine, midterms, and Eurasian movements.

Peter Isackson 22, chief strategy officer at the Fair Observer, 3/3/2022, "How Coherent Is NATO Today and in the Future?," Fair Observer, <https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/peter-isackson-nato-news-today-joe-biden-nato-secretary-general-ukraine-russia-news-82392/>, RMax

One of the longer-term consequences of the current crisis is something no one seems willing to talk about at this moment as everyone is concerned with expressing their solidarity with the Ukrainian people. Numerous commentators have interpreted Russia’s aggression as a signal that the West is for once becoming united and will be stronger than ever when the fighting dies down and Russia is humbled.

The question no one wants to assess realistically is precisely the evolving image of NATO, particularly for Europeans. The idea that the Russian assault will strengthen Europe’s commitment to NATO to avoid future crises is naive at best and the product of the kind of illusion Biden has created with his rhetoric. What is happening today is frightening, and to the extent that the problem itself turns around the existence of NATO, without compromising their empathy for Ukrainians, Europeans have already begun reflecting on the danger NATO represents for their political and economic future.

Europeans have plenty to think about. Depending on how the war itself plays out, two things seem likely in the near future. The first is that, thanks to the unpopularity of Biden at home, it seems inevitable that the Republican Party will control Congress in 2023 and that a Republican will likely defeat the Democrats in the presidential election of 2024. This appears even more likely were either President Biden or Vice-President Kamala Harris to be the party’s standard bearer. The Republican Party is still dominated by Donald Trump, a fact that clearly unsettles most politicians and political thinkers in Europe. The marketers of both parties, over at least the past eight years, have failed to defend their once prestigious brand.

Depending on Europe’s capacity to act independently after decades of accepting to remain in the shadow of the US, welcomed as their protector in the aftermath of World War II, it is highly likely that a movement will emerge to create a European and possibly Eurasian security framework that could replace or, at the very least, marginalize NATO. And even after the fiasco of the Ukraine War (Vladimir Putin’s folly), that new framework might even include Russia.